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I.
INTRODUCTION

The State of Utah (the "State") has filed a Brief as
an intervenor in this action, predictably supporting the
position of the Appellants Roger Sharp ("Sharp") and Tim W.
Healy ("Healy") that this Court wrongly decided Condemarin v.
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) and that the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") is constitutional.
To the extent that the State merely mimics the arguments of
Sharp and Healy, Appellee Shelly Hipwell ("Hipwell") will not
further burden the record on this appeal with a response.
However, Hipwell will respond in this Brief to certain
arguments raised by the State.
As will be demonstrated below, none of the grounds
upon which the State seeks to have this Court overrule its
decision in Condemarin are well taken and the decision of the
district court should be affirmed.

II.
ARGUMENT

A.

THE GOVERNMENTAL/PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION APPLIED

TO THE STATE AT COMMON LAW.

The State insists that the governmental/proprietary
distinction only applied to municipalities at common law at
the time the Utah Constitution was adopted, but cites no cases
holding that when the State itself performed a proprietary
function it was nevertheless immune from liability.

Hipwell

will not repeat all of the authorities and arguments on this
issue set forth in Appellee's Brief.

However, in addition to

the authorities cited in her brief, the following additional
cases each recognized that the governmental/proprietary
2

distinction was not limited to municipalities at common law.
Calkins v. Newton, 97 P. 2d 523 (Cal. 1939) (where there were
no private general hospitals in the area, the operation of a
general hospital by the county was a "governmental function11
but county would be liable for functions of a proprietary
nature); Zoeller v. State Board of Agriculture, 173 S.W. 1143
(Ken. 1915) (State Board of Agriculture in conducting the
state fair exercised a governmental function and was therefore
immune from liability); Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Byron-Bethany
Irr. Dist., 29 P.2d 217 (Cal. 1934); Willcox v. Erie County,
297 N.Y.S. 287 (1937) (county's action in constructing and
maintaining a slide at a public park was a governmental
function rather than proprietary and therefore the county was
immune from liability); Bell v. City of Pittsburgh, 146 A. 567
(Penn. 1929) (county which jointly owned and operated building
for business and governmental purposes with city held liable
for negligence in operation of elevator); Yolo v. Modesto Irr.
Dist., 13 P.2d 908 (Cal. 1932).

See also Apfelbacher v.

State, 152 N.W. 144 (Wis. 1915) (the propagation of fish by
the state for stocking of public streams is a governmental,
not a proprietary function, so that the state is immune from
liability for torts committed during the exercise of such
function.

Whether the state would be liable if the activity

were considered proprietary was expressly reserved for future
consideration).

3

In Appellee's Brief, it was argued that prior to the
adoption of the Utah Constitution states restricted their
activities to governmental functions and therefore there was
little, if any, opportunity for the courts to directly address
the issue of the applicability of the governmental/proprietary
distinction to the state itself.
to this argument in its brief.

The State gives short shrift

However, the historical

context in which the common law developed with respect to the
governmental/proprietary distinction is important and is
illustrated by the case of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.
v. Wainscott, 19 P.2d 328 (Ariz. 1933).

There, suit was

brought against members of the County Board of Supervisors for
purchasing liability insurance covering the county's vehicles.
The court recognized that the county would be liable for
proprietary functions, but concluded that the county could not
have legally used the motor vehicles in anything but the
performance of a governmental function because there was no
authority for the county to engage in any proprietary
functions.

Thus, because the county could not be liable for

the performance of a governmental function, liability
insurance should not have been purchased.
The State also protests that Hipwell supposedly
misinterpreted this Court's holding in Bingham v. Board of
Education of Oaden City, 223 P.2d 432 (Utah 1950).

The State

claims that if this Court had applied the governmental/
proprietary distinction, it would have denied the board
4

immunity because the injury in Bingham, so the State claims,
arose not from the school board's alleged negligent
performance of its educational function, but from the
operation of an incinerator to burn books and other garbage on
school grounds —

a supposedly proprietary function.

State's position is tortured.

The

The State does not even

attempt to explain how a school board's burning of old books
or other garbage is a proprietary function.

Clearly, all

actions which a school board takes in pursuit of educating
children within its district, including hiring of teachers,
constructing schools, providing school lunches, maintaining
buildings, and acquiring and disposing of school books and
other materials, are governmental functions performed in the
course of the school board's charge of operating public
schools.

B.

NO IMMUNITY EXISTED AT COMMON LAW FOR THE

NEGLIGENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES OR FOR THE TYPE OF
CONDUCT INVOLVED IN THIS CASE.

The State erroneously contends that employees of state
hospitals were immune from liability at common law at the time
the Utah Constitution was adopted because their actions fell
under the discretionary function exception to liability and
chides Hipwell for oversimplifying the liability of
governmental employees under the common law.
5

The State's

argument seriously distorts both the immunity of governmental
employees under the common law at the time of the adoption of
the Utah Constitution and the scope of the discretionary
function immunity later adopted by the courts.1

1.

State Employees Were Liable for Negligence at

Common Law.

First, the State's argument that at the time the Utah
Constitution was adopted, governmental employees were immune
from damages for negligence committed in the performance of
discretionary acts as opposed to ministerial acts is wrong and
the State cites no authorities which support that proposition.
The commentators, including the very law review
articles relied upon by the State, recognize that under the
early common law there was no distinction between the

1

Sharp and Healy argue in their Reply Briefs that Hipwell did
not raise below the argument that the Act was unconstitutional
because it limited suits against individual health care providers.
In the court below, the issue was whether this court's decision in
Condemarin was applicable to the case at bar or whether later
amendments avoided the constitutional infirmities found in
Condemarin. Sharp and Healy did not raise the issue of whether
Condemarin had been correctly decided until their last Reply
Memorandum.
That issue was not and could not have been reached
by the district court. The district court held that Condemarin was
binding. Therefore, the question of whether if Condemarin was
incorrectly decided and the damage limitation was valid the Act was
nevertheless unconstitutional for taking away the right to sue
individual employees without substituting a reasonably equivalent
remedy was not before the district court. Moreover, Hipwell did
in fact raise this argument at the hearing on Sharp's and Healy's
Motions for Summary Judgment.
[Reporter's Transcript of
Proceedings on March 30, 1992, p. 23-24].
6

liability of public officers and ordinary citizens for
negligence.

See, e.g., W. Gellhorn and C. Byse,

Administrative Law, § 8 at p. 335-36 (6th Ed. 1974); G.
Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability,
77 Columbia L.Rev. 1175-78 (1977); J. Flemming, Tort Liability
of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.Chi.L.Rev. 610,
635 (1955).

For example, Professor Bermann wrote in the

Columbia Law Review cited at length by the State that:
The restlessness of the courts on the
question of officer immunity reflects conflicting
policy considerations. On the one hand,
wrongdoing seems worth deterring or punishing
whatever hat the wrongdoer happens to wear.
Moreover, there is something anomalous about
denying relief to a tort victim simply because he
had the added misfortune of being injured by a
public official rather than a private citizen.
Thus, the common law traditionally did not
distinguish between public officials and private
individuals for purposes of determining the scope
of personal tort liability. In fact, courts that
drew such a distinction often imposed a stricter
standard of care on officials than on private
individuals, holding them personally liable for
the consequences of simple non-negligent
mistakes.
More recently, however, the courts have
recognized that the threat of personal liability
may make public officials unduly fearful in their
exercise of authority and discourage them from
taking prompt and decisive action. This concern,
which rests upon the plausible though
undocumented assumption that such burdens cannot
be imposed upon individual officials without
breeding an unhealthy timidity on their part, has
led many courts to accord administrative
officials at least a qualified immunity that
would relieve them of liability for the
reasonable and good faith exercise of discretion
within the scope of their authority. Limiting
immunity to discretionary functions follows from
the premise that fear of personal liability can
inhibit conduct only when there is room for
judgment in deciding whether or how to act. In
7

"ministerial11 matters in which officials are
thought to have no such discretion, this fear is
somewhat naively assumed to have no inhibiting
effect.
[77 Columbia L.Rev. at 1178-79].

[Emphasis added].

Professor Fleming put the matter this way in his
article in the University of Chicago Law Review relied upon by
the State:
The Anglo-American tradition did not include
a general theory of immunity from suit or from
liability on the part of public officers. It was
the boast of Dicey, often-quoted, that "[w]ith us
every official, from the Prime Minister down to a
constable of collector of taxes, is under the
same responsibility for every act done without
legal justification as any other citizen." . . .
[H]e was liable in very much the same way as a
private individual, including the employee of a
private business, would be. Thus, were an
officer, authorized by statute to seize undried
leather, mistakenly but in good faith, seized
what turned out to be dried leather, he was
liable as a trespasser.
[22 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 635].
The common law in effect at the time of the adoption
of the Utah Constitution is well illustrated by Justice
Holmes' decision in Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100 (Mass.
1891).

In that case, the town commissioners determined that

the plaintiff's horse had a contagious disease and ordered the
Board of Health to destroy the animal.

The trial court found

that the horse did*not in fact have the contagious disease,
but held that the defendants were nevertheless protected from
liability.

Justice Holmes held that the man who killed the

horse was not protected from liability by the fact that he had

8

been ordered to do so by the commissioners if the horse did
not have the contagious disease and was fully liable for his
wrongful act in destroying the horse.
Similarly, in Lowe v. Conrov, 97 N.W. 942 (Wis. 1904),
a veterinary official had the duty of destroying diseased
cattle.

He determined that a steer was diseased and ordered

it destroyed.

The jury determined that in fact the steer was

not diseased, even though the officer had concluded otherwise.
Judgment against the official for damages was affirmed.
Finally, in Davie v. Regents of University of
California. 227 P. 247 (Cal. 1924), suit was instituted
against the regents of the University of California and
against a physician who was in charge of an infirmary
maintained at the university.

Demurrers to an amended

complaint were sustained with respect to both defendants on
the basis of sovereign immunity.

The appellate court upheld

the sustaining of the demurrer with respect to the university
on the basis that the operation of the infirmary was solely a
governmental function, but reversed the sustaining of the
demurrer as to the individual physician, observing:
Where wrongs are done to individuals by
those who are the servants of the government,
those injured are not remediless, as such
servants or employees may be sued the same as
other persons for torts which they have
committed.
[227 P. at 248].

9

The discretionary/ministerial distinction with respect
to the liability of governmental employees appears to have its
roots in the principle that judicial officers were absolutely
immune from liability in discharging their functions.

This

principle was later expanded to quasi-judicial officers and
then to administrative employees as well.

W. Gellhorn and C

Byse, Administrative Law, supra, at p. 337-38.

However, it

does not appear that the discretionary/ministerial distinction
immunizing governmental employees for discretionary acts
gained much acceptance until the 1920's and 1930's. See,
e.g., Wasserman v. Kenosha, 258 N.W. 857 (Wis. 1935);
Gottschalk v. Shepperd, 270 N.W. 573 (N.D. 1935).
The State relies on this Court's decision in Connell
v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), to show that Utah
has adopted the discretionary/ministerial distinction.

In

that case, however, the defendants moved to dismiss on the
basis that the plaintiff's claim against them was "barred by
the common law doctrine of immunity of judicial and quasijudicial officers."

[572 P.2d at 698]. [Emphasis added].

Although recognizing the distinction, the court held that a
clerk's duty of entering a citation in the docket book and
assigning a case number was a ministerial duty.

Most

importantly, this decision in 1977 in no way stated or implied
that the discretionary/ministerial function distinction was
recognized under the common law in Utah in effect when the
constitution was adopted.
10

2.

The Negligence Complained of in the Present Case

Was Committed in the Exercise of a Ministerial Function.

Even if it were assumed that the discretionary/
ministerial distinction applied at common law at the time the
Utah Constitution was adopted, the negligent acts of Dr. Weiss
in this case were committed during the performance of a
ministerial function, not a discretionary function, as
demonstrated by the very Utah cases relied upon by the State.
Prosser and Keeton describe the scope of the
discretionary function immunity as follows:
It is usually said that the immunity protects
acts within the scope of the officerfs duty only
if the acts are "discretionary." This means,
more or less, that the acts involve some fairly
high level of policy making. Acts that do not
qualify as "discretionary" acts are usually
called "ministerial" and for purely ministerial
acts of executive officers or employees there is
no immunity. Acts that create personal risk to
others and acts involving ordinary considerations
of physical safety are usually in this category
where there are no serious governmental concerns.
[W. Prosser and W. Keeton on Torts, p. 1060 (5th Ed. 1984].
In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348
(Utah 1989), Justice Durham recognized that under the law
existing at the time the 1978 Amendment to the Act was passed,
public employees were not immune from suit while acting in a
ministerial capacity even though the employee's acts may
involve some decision making, that operational acts of

11

employees were not protected and that under the common law in
existence at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted,
individual health care providers were liable for their
negligence.
In Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667
P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983), cited by the State, this Court set
forth the following requirements for a discretionary function
and held the requirements had not been met:
Where the responsibility for basic policy
decisions has been committed to one of the
branches of our tri-partite system of government,
the courts have refrained from sitting in
judgment of the propriety of those decisions.
[Citation omitted] . . . To be purely
discretionary, an act by the state must be
affirmed under four preliminary questions:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or
decision necessarily involve a basic governmental
policy, program or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or
objective as opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction of the policy,
program or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision
require the exercise of basic policy evaluation,
judgment, and expertise on the part of the
governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional, statutory,
or lawful authority or duty to do or make the
challenged act, omission, or decision? [Emphasis
added].
The acts complained of here are the state's
failure to properly evaluate the home into which
Jennifer was to be placed, failure to properly
supervise her placement, and failure to protect
her from harm, when the state knew or should have
known that such harm was likely. Assuming that
the decision to place Jennifer in a foster home
was a discretionary one, once that decision was
made and the placement ordered, the question was
no longer whether the child was to receive foster

12

care, but whether due care was exercised under a
duty assumed. Where a breach of that duty can be
shown, the government is held to the same
standard as private individuals and cannot cloak
itself with the mantel of discretion.
Similarly, in Doe v. Arauelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah
1985), another case improperly relied upon by the State, a
State official was sued for his decision to release a juvenile
into the community subject to certain conditions and for the
negligent supervision of the juvenile once he was released
into the community.

This Court held that the decision to

place the juvenile into the community was shielded from
liability under the discretionary function exception, but held
that the later negligent supervision of the juvenile was not
protected, saying:
Operational, routine, every day matters not
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors and
which only implement established policy are nondiscretionary, ministerial functions. A decision
or action implementing a pre-existing policy is
operational in nature and is undeserving of
protection under the discretionary function
exception. [Citations omitted] Because a
probation officer's policy decisions are
discretionary, he is immune from suit arising
from those decisions. However, his acts
implementing the policy must be considered on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether they are
ministerial and thereby outside immunity
protections.
. . . If it can be shown at trial that the
injury to plaintiff's ward was proximately caused
by Stromberg's omissions, it did not result from
the discretion vested in him to place Arguelles
in the community, but from his negligence in
monitoring the prescribed treatment after making
the discretionary decision to do so. Under those
circumstances, the State would not be immune from
suit under the discretionary function exception.

13

[716 P.2d at 282-83].

See also Whitt v. Reed, 239 S.W. 2d

489 (Kan. 1951); Hanslev v. Tilton. 655 S.E.2d 300 (No.Car.
1951) .
In the case at bar, the negligence committed by Dr.
Weiss can hardly be said to have been committed during the
performance of a discretionary function.

His duties simply

did not involve basic policy-making decisions but were
operational in nature.

Even if it were assumed for purposes

of argument that Dr. Weiss1 decision to perform the procedure
on Mrs. Hipwell was a discretionary function, the fact remains
that Dr. Weiss1 negligent performance of that procedure was
clearly ministerial.

Consequently, the discretionary function

exception is wholly inapplicable.
The State relies heavily on Estate of Burks v. Ross,
438 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1971), to attempt to support its
discretionary function argument.
assistance.

Burks offers little, if any,

There, the court held that an administrator of a

veteran's hospital and a doctor who was the director of
neuropsychiatry were not liable for damages when a patient
escaped from the hospital and was struck and killed by a train
because they were involved in discretionary functions.

The

court stated that a "discretionary function or duty" included
both the initiation of programs and activities and
determinations made by executors or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations
and that "where there is room for policy judgment and
14

decision, there is discretion."

[438 F.2d at 234].

The court

held, however, that the actions of the actual nurses and
assistants involved in the care of patients were ministerial
and that they were not protected from liability for negligence
in caring for their patients.
The State's reliance on Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d
765 (3rd Cir. 1976) is also misplaced. In Martinez, the Third
Circuit held that the defendants who were army physicians on
active duty were not liable for alleged negligence in
performing surgery on a retired enlisted man.

The court based

its decision not on any discretionary/ministerial distinction
as implied by the State, but rather upon the court's earlier
decision in Bailey v. DeOuevedo, 375 F.2d 72, 74 (3rd Cir.
1967), cert denied 389 U.S. 923, that, "An enlisted man in the
armed services of the United States cannot maintain an action
against an Army medical surgeon for negligence in an operation
performed at an Army hospital in the line of duty."

[537 F.2d

at 766].
Brown v. Northbill Reg. Psychiatric Hospital, 395
N.W.2d 18 (Mich.App. 1986), cited by the State, likewise does
not support its position.

In the first place, it appears that

Michigan's definition of what constitutes a discretionary
function is significantly broader than in Utah.

But even

under Michigan law the court recognized that although the
decision of whether to engage in a particular activity and how
best to carry it out was a discretionary function, that the
15

actual execution of that decision was a ministerial act.

The

court held that summary judgment had been improperly granted
on plaintiff's claim that the individual defendants had failed
to properly follow rules and procedures for discharging a
psychiatric patient on the basis that if a rule or standard
existed requiring that the discharge of a patient be
accompanied by medication and through negligence no medication
was administered, then that would be a negligent ministerial
act.2

C.

THE ACT DID NOT SUBSTITUTE A REASONABLY EQUIVALENT

REMEDY.

The State argues that even if the Act restricted a
right which Hipwell had under the common law to sue the
individual employees of the University Hospital that the Act
is constitutional because it substituted a reasonably
equivalent remedy.

The State reaches this conclusion by

positing that the Act substituted a solvent defendant for "an
often financially irresponsible defendant" and that the Act
enhances chances of recovery by eliminating the need to

2

Brown also noted that in order for the discretionary
function exception to apply, the act performed must be within the
scope of the officer's authority or the employee must have
reasonably so believed. There is no evidence in this case that Dr.
Weiss had the authority to perform this type of procedure, which
he had never performed before.

16

establish the fault of any governmental employee.

These

arguments are absolutely without merit.
The State relies principally on the argument that by
waiving governmental immunity against the state up to
$250,000.00, that the Act substituted a solvent defendant for
financially irresponsible defendants.

First of all, it is

important to note that the original Governmental Immunity Act
did not limit recovery against the University Hospital. When
the 1978 Amendment was passed enacting the $250,000.00 damage
limitation and shielding employees from personal liability,
the State did not substitute any remedy.

The State had

already waived immunity back in 1965.
Moreover, it is suspect at best to assert that the
Statefs actions in depriving injured persons of unlimited
recovery against physicians and other medical personnel
employed by the State can be constitutionally validated by
substituting a severely limited right of recovery against the
State, especially in view of the prevalence of medical
malpractice insurance.

Of course, since Sharp and Healy filed

their motion for summary judgment almost at the outset of this
case, Sharp and Healy have presented no evidence whatsoever
that would support any finding that substitution of a
$250,000.00 remedy against the State is a reasonable
equivalent remedy to the right to recover unlimited damages
against physicians and other hospital employees.
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At the very

least, this is a question of fact which would have to be
resolved at trial.
The State does not cite one case in support of its
argument that the limited remedy against the State is a
reasonably equivalent substitute remedy.

Instead, the State

cites extensively from two law review articles, Integrating
Governmental and Officer Tort Liability. 77 Columbia L.Rev.
1175 (1977) and Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their
Officers, 22 U.Chi.L.Rev. 610 (1955), to attempt to support
its arguments.

However, those law review articles do not even

attempt to deal with issues raised by statutes which limit
damages recoverable against the State and the articles are
consequently of little value in deciding the issues raised in
the case at bar.
The State•s next argument that the Act enhances
chances of recovery by eliminating the need to establish the
fault of any individual governmental employee borders on the
absurd.

In all cases (absent the applicability of some

special doctrine such as res ipsa loquitur), a plaintiff is
going to have to show that some human being acted or failed to
act negligently or wrongfully in order to recover from the
State.

For example, in the present case, Hipwell is going to

have to prove at trial that Dr. Weiss and/or some other
specific employees at the University Hospital acted
negligently with respect to their treatment of Hipwell.

The

Act did not purport to nor did it eliminate any need to prove
18

wrongdoing by specific state employees or representatives nor
otherwise reduce a plaintiff's burden of proving negligence or
other wrongdoing against the State.

D.

THE ACT WAS NOT A REASONABLE MEANS OF ACHIEVING

IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES.

Finally, rehashing the arguments which it
unsuccessfully urged upon this Court in Condemarin. the State
argues that the restriction on the right to sue government
employees and the damage limitation were reasonable means
employed by the legislature to combat the "vast potential
liability of the state" which could result in "such severe
cutbacks in essential governmental services as to seriously
hamper state government."

As this Court noted in Condemarin.

and as the State itself recognizes in its Brief [p. 20, fn.
7], there is absolutely no evidence to demonstrate any such
crisis.

In any event, under Condemarin. the existence of such

a crisis would not be a reason to shift the entire burden of
catastrophic injury onto the shoulders of the injured and
there is no reason to suppose that limiting the rights of
victims will produce the benefits envisioned by the
legislature.
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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons and those set forth in
Appellees' Brief, it is respectfully submitted that the
district court's decision should be affirmed.
DATED this j — day of January, 1993.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

^^fi^^M
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Appellees

jt hipwell.app\bncf.2
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